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The East India Company’s relationship with Bhutan may be 
traced back to the conflict between the Princely state of Cooch 
Behar and Bhutan in 1772 where the Deb Raja of Bhutan 
defeated King Khagendra Narayan of Cooch Behar. The 
latter’s army commander Nazir Deo re-attacked Bhutan1 on 
behalf of the Prince and subsequently won the battle with the 
help of British soldiers. The relation between Bhutan and 
British India became imminent when the Deb Raja solicited 
the mediation of Panchen Lama of Tibet and fell back to the 
British power. This relationship, however, opened up a new 
vista to British imperialism from the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century onwards. While the East India Company’s 
desire to promote its trade in the Himalayan kingdoms, 
especially Tibet, was one of the reasons to this end, the other 
reason might be its design to consolidate its empire in this 
subcontinent against the expansion of the Russian and 
Chinese imperialism. Various political events like wars and 
peace-treaties followed as the Company administration in 
Bengal sought to realise these objectives. In the ultimate 
analysis, these political events shaped the trade relation of 
Bhutan with its neighbouring countries. The present article 
seeks to bring out these causations between various political 
events and trade relation of Bhutan during the previous 
centuries. 
  
Section I of this article documents various political events 
that led to the evolution of Bhutanese trade during the 
eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. Section II, however, traces 
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out various political events that were intended to obstruct the 
expansion of Russian and Chinese imperialism. Section III 
contains a brief conclusion.    
Section I: Major political events prior to 1900 
The East India Company always operated on the motive of 
trade and for the promotion of British goods in overseas 
markets. These basic objectives of the Company explained its 
growing interest on Bhutan from the second half of the 
eighteenth century onwards. Moreover, as Bengal’s route to 
Tibet through Nepal had already been closed by that period2, 
the Company was eager to find out an alternative trade route 
to Tibet and China via Bhutan. The relationship with Bhutan 
could enable the Company to access the markets in the 
Himalayan kingdoms for their goods. A letter of Warren 
Hastings, the-then Governor General of East India Company, 
to the Court of Directors in London, supports this surmise. 
He wrote on April 4, 1771 “It …[has] been presented to us 
that the Company may be greatly benefited in the sale of 
broadcloth, iron and lead and other European commodities 
by sending proper persons to reside at Rungapore to explore 
the interest of parts of Bhutan…..”3  Warren Hastings, indeed, 
took various steps in favour of the Bhutanese traders so that 
the English trades could get an access to that country. He 
also sent four political missions to Bhutan and Tibet, headed 
respectively by Bogle in 1774, Hamilton in 1776 and 1777, 
and Turner in 1783.  
  
These missions were primarily entrusted with the job to 
secure permission for European merchants to trade in 
Bhutan and Tibet. The Bhutanese traders had all along been 
strongly objecting to any such concession as they 
apprehended that the European participation in this business 
would curtail their share in it and dampen the rate of return 
therefrom. In particular, as a principal trader in that world of 
                                              
2 Secret Consultations, 24th February 1775, No. 4, referred in Gupta, 
British Relations with Bhutan, p. 44. 
3 Collister, Bhutan and the British. p.8. 
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business, the Deb Raja was strictly in opposition. Bogle thus 
revealed, “The Deb Raja made many objections to allowing 
merchants to pass through Bhutan, insisting that it had 
never been the custom [for] strangers to come into their 
kingdom…”4 The Deb Raja, however, rationalised his 
judgement in various ways. Once he pointed out, “[T]he 
inhabitants [of Bhutan] were of a hot and violent temper, and 
the country woody and mountainous; and in case of 
merchants being robbed it might occasion disputes and 
misunderstanding between them and the Company’s 
servants.”5 To Bogle such statements simply intended to 
camouflage his private interest: “The opposition of the Bhotias 
really proceeded from motives which they industrially 
concealed.”6 Similar statement was put on record by the next 
Deb Raja when Hamilton visited Bhutan. The ambassador of 
the-then Deb Raja carried a message to Bogle against the 
entry of the English and other Europeans in Bhutan.7 Bogle 
was, however, able to secure the access of non-European 
traders from Bengal for the purpose of trade in Bhutan.8 One 
of the articles of the agreement between the East India 
Company and the Deb Raja of Bhutan that was concluded at 
that time proclaimed, “[T]he Deb Raja shall allow all Hindu 
and Musalman merchants freely to pass and repass through 
his country between Bengal and Tibet.”9 The argument also 
provided certain benefits to the Bhutanese traders in Bengal. 
We may mention in this context that the Bhutanese traders 
were given to enjoy trade privileges at Rangpur in Bengal as 
before and they could also proceed, either themselves or by 
their gumashtas, to all places in Bengal for the sell of horses, 
                                              
4 Public Conr., 19th April 1779, No. 2, containing Bogle’s report to 
Warren Hastings dated 30th September 1775 referred in Gupta, 
British Relations with Bhutan, pp. 42-43. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Sen, Records in Oriental Languages (Bengali Letters), vol. I, No. 1 
referred in Majumdar, Britain and the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhotan, 
p.54. 
8 Majumdar, Britain and the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhotan, p.52. 
9 Gupta, British Relations with Bhutan, pp. 46-47. 
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free from duty or any other hindrance; that the contemporary 
duty levied at Rangpur from the Bhutanese caravan was 
abolished; that there had earlier been a ban on the purchase 
of oil and dried fish in Rangpur by Bhutanese merchants. On 
the complaints received from them, Warren Hastings removed 
all those bans. He instructed, “[T]he district official should 
issue Perwannahs to the Zeminders and officers of the 
districts in which the Bootias have been accustomed to buy 
these articles, to protect and assist them in carrying on their 
trade and to allow their oil and dried fish freely to pass the 
different chokeys and gauts.”10 We may also mention that the 
exclusive trade privilege was given to the Bhutanese sellers in 
sandal, indigo, otter skins, tobacco, betel-nut and pan; other 
merchants were thus prohibited to import these commodities 
into Bhutan11 and that the government extended civic 
facilities to the Bhutanese and Tibetan traders who visited 
Calcutta every year in winter to sell their wares. A Buddhist 
temple was also constructed near Calcutta, which they could 
use as a meeting place, a place of night halt as well as for the 
purpose of prayer.12
 
In addition to promoting trade to Tibet via Bhutan, the British 
Government in Bengal sought to enhance the commercial 
contact between the hill people and the inhabitants of the 
plain. In this connection, Warren Hastings advised Bogle on 
May 13, 1774, “The design of your mission is to open a 
mutual and equal communication of trade between the 
inhabitants of Bhutan and Bengal….”13 To this end, the 
British Government took initiatives to establish a series of 
trade fairs in the plain where the hill people could 
conveniently participate. We may cite in this context the trade 
fair at Rangpur (now in Bangladesh) which Bogle initiated in 
1780, and also the Titaliya fair in Jalpaiguri district14 that Dr. 
                                              
10 Quoted in Firminger (ed.), Bengal District Records, Rangpur, vol. I., 
p.5. 
11 Ibid. p.47. 
12 Deb, Bhutan and India, p.138. 
13 Collister, Bhutan and the British, p. 13. 
14 Hunter, A Statistical Account of Bengal, p. 270. 
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Campbell, the first Superintendent of Darjeeling, established. 
This practice continued in the following century. Among the 
fairs that the British government set up for the interaction 
with the hill people, the important ones were the Phalakata 
trade fair15, the Alipur fair16 and the Kalimpong fair. Large 
number of traders from Sikkim, Nepal, Tibet and Bhutan 
used to attend these fairs.  These annual gatherings not only 
promoted British goods to a wider market but also 
strengthened the Anglo-Bhutanese relation, and pacified 
instability across the border. Collister thus remarked, 
“…Campbell’s administration provided an enlightened period 
of comparative peace on the frontier during which trade 
between Bhutan and Company’s land was encouraged.”17 
Apart from establishing these fairs, the government 
patronaged these fairs every year, and looked after their 
securities18 by stationing policemen at Phalakata and Alipur19 
and entrusting the job for the Alipur fair to the military 
cantonment at Buxa.20
 
The British move to promote trade with Bhutan through fairs 
was due to the contemporary trade practices and rules in 
Bhutan. The Bhutanese rules and regulations on the 
domestic and foreign trade had been in vogue since the time 
of Ngawang Namgyal in the seventeenth century. For 
domestic trade, Namgyal had laid down, “[A]ll barter or 
trading should be carried on at fair and prevailing rates and 
not at extortionate and preferential ones. Forced gifts of 
butter or salt were also strictly forbidden.”21 For export and 
import trade he had enforced, “The headman should inspect 
the product of the country industries, and see that they are 
honest and solid in the make and texture. The merchants 
who have the responsibility of the import trade at the different 
                                              
15 Ibid. p. 297. 
16 Ibid. p. 270. 
17 Collister, Bhutan and the British, p. 78. 
18 Deb, Bhutan and India, p. 63. 
19 Hunter, A Statistical Account of Bengal, p. 295. 
20 Ibid. p.262. 
21 Hasrat, The History of Bhutan, pp.57-58. 
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marts also satisfy that they get good things, and all traders 
must obey the State merchants in these particulars.”22 These 
rules were mandatory for all traders in Bhutan. 
 
While the British government in Bengal had thus been 
striving for better trade with Bhutan since the 1770s, a series 
of political events in this Himalayan kingdom around the 
second half of the nineteenth century further added 
momentum to development. In this connection we stress 
specifically the annexation of Assam and Bengal duars during 
1841-65. It is well established by now that the maintenance 
of peace at the Assam-Bhutan frontier was the primary 
objective of the British administration in Bengal behind the 
annexation of duars.23 But the trade motive was also there. 
Around the mid-nineteenth century Assam became 
economically important due to her land and climatic 
conditions that suited uniquely for the cultivation of tea. The 
East India Company turned to Assam for tea plantation in 
1833 when the Chinese Government did not renew the 
Company’s monopoly right over its lucrative trade in tea. 
Speculations on tea made duars lucrative to the British since 
the clearance of undulating forest in this region was expected 
to generate revenue from timber, and to make the place at the 
same time ideal for the cultivation of tea. The duar tract was, 
indeed, rich in timber, especially for extensive sal forests in 
Sidli, Ripu and Chirang duar. To clear these tracts, the forest 
tribes like Meches, Garos, Cacharis and Parbateas24 were 
expected to migrate into this region as the labour force. 
Immigrants were also expected from surrounding districts 
under British administration and Cooch Behar. In addition to 
tea and timber, two more considerations were there. First, 
cotton was cultivated abundantly on the slopes of the hills, 
and these so-called ‘hill-cottons’ might be exploited for 
profitable ends; and second, the region had ‘an excellent 
                                              
22 Ibid. 
23 Gupta, British Relations with Bhutan, p. 193. 
24 Proceedings of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Oct, referred in 
Gupta, British Relations with Bhutan, p. 141. 
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market for English cloth and brass and copper ware.’25 The 
British administration was, therefore, confident about the 
duar tract being eventually able to attract entrepreneurs for 
tea and cotton plantation as well as for the exploitation of 
timber. A conjecture of more than three times increment in 
revenue generation within one and a half decade was the 
driving force behind the annexation of this region in the 
British dominion. After a number of battles with Bhutan, the 
British conquered seven duars in Assam and eleven duars in 
Bengal.  
 
Although the Bengal Government paid a sum of Rs.50000 to 
Bhutan as compensation, the annexation of duars had 
serious adverse impacts on the Bhutanese economy in 
general and on her trade in particular. Bhutan had earlier 
kept trade linkage with Assam and Bengal through these 
duars. Her people including the privileged class used to get all 
necessary and luxury items from these places.26 Indeed, 
Bhutanese traders faced unprecedented hazards in business 
due to the economic blockade that the British enforced during 
the duar war. Also, the local people of duars, the Mechis for 
example, suffered from scarcity and starvation as they 
primarily survived on trade with Bhutan. They were on record 
to complain,  
 
“[W]e regret to say that owing to the scarcity of rice our 
helpless families are brought to starve. The cause of the 
grievances arises from the war, being still continued. The 
merchants, who had hitherto supplied us with rice and 
cotton seeds, venture not to come to our quarter 
nowadays.”27  
 
In view of the resentments of the Bhutanese government and 
her people, the British administration in Bengal adapted a 
number of measures. An annual compensation to the 
Government of Bhutan by Rs.50000 was surely an important 
                                              
25 Ibid. pp. 140-141. 
26 Deb, Bhutan and India, p. 118. 
27 Referred in Sen, “The Duar War of 1865”, p. 29. 
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step to this end. Moreover, the British provided a series of 
facilities to Bhutan’s trade and commerce.28 Among other 
measures that were targeted to pacify the traders in Bhutan, 
the Bengal Government established weekly markets, called 
‘hats’, at suitable places where the Bhutanese traders and 
consumers could procure rice, cotton, dried fish, pigs, lac, 
tobacco etc. that were produced in plenty in duars. Such hats 
were also set up in several places in Darrang and Kamrup 
duars.29
 
The duar war had far-reaching socio-political impacts in this 
Himalayan kingdom. Since an early time the Penlops 
(governors) were involved in fighting with each other leading 
to turmoil in domestic law and order situation. For the first 
time, the duar war motivated them to form a pressure group 
to initiate peace dialogue with the British. The Deb Raja was 
also in favour of such a dialogue. The chief intention of these 
Governors was obviously the prosperity of the Bhutanese 
trade which they themselves carried out heavily. This effort 
culminated to the Sinchula Treaty in 1865. It brought an end 
to hostilities, and provided a congenial environment for 
mutual peace and friendship between Bhutan and British 
India. This Treaty was based on the philosophy of laissez faire 
which swept the British society around the mid nineteenth 
century. This free trade philosophy was contained mainly in 
article IX of the Treaty, which abolished the contemporary 
duty on the import and export of the Bhutanese goods in 
India and also on the British goods imported in Bhutan or 
transported through it.30
 
The Sinchula Treaty was not very successful for two basic 
reasons. First, the free trade doctrine of the Treaty was not 
widely acceptable to the Bhutanese society. We have already 
pointed out that the Bhutanese were suspicious about the 
European traders; and they did not allow them to trade 
                                              
28 Gupta, British Relations with Bhutan, p. 115. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. 
XIV, Part IV, p. 98. 
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directly in Bhutan for a long time. Possibly this fear-psychosis 
developed out of their experience in its neighbour country of 
Bengal where the European trading community ultimately 
took over the political power. Secondly, some provisions in 
the above Treaty were violated by Lord Bentink and this 
adversely affected the interest of Bhutanese trade. As for 
example, Bentinck discontinued the allowance that had been 
provided to the leaders of trade caravans from Bhutan at 
Dinajpur and Rangpur.31 Free accommodation of the 
Bhutanese at the market places was also discontinued. These 
created serious resentment among the Bhutanese traders.   
 
While the Sinchula Treaty could not much accelerate the 
Bhutanese trade for the above reasons, the internal political 
chaos that took place during 1866 to 189832 crippled trading 
activities in the country. Three civil wars were fought here in 
succession. The first one ran for about two years since 1866 
in consequence of the conflict between the Wangdiphodrand 
Dzongpon (Officer in charge of a district) and the Punakha 
Dzongpon; the second civil war broke out in 1877 as the 
Punakha Dzongpon revolted against the Deb Raja; and the 
third one occurred in 1884 with the Deb Raja, the Thimphu 
Dzongpon and the Punakha Dzongpon on the one side, and 
the Trongsa Penlop, Paro Penlop and various other local 
Dzongpons on the other. Out of these civil wars the Trongsa 
Penlop emerged as the undisputed ruler of Bhutan.  
 
For these long-drawn internal disturbances a downward 
trend ushered in Bhutan’s trade with British India during the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. This is borne in Figure 
1 which displays the trends of her imports and exports (along 
with the total for 1879-1900). It clearly demonstrates a steady 
decline in all these series. Taking import and export together, 
the shrinkage is worked out at 7.44 percent annually, from 
Rs.675 thousand in 1879-80 to Rs.271 thousand in 1899-
1900. To grasp these trends more precisely, we present below 
                                              
31 Rennie, Bhotan and the story of the Dooar War, pp.159-160. 
32 Singh, Himalayan Triangle, p. 330. 
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the estimated trends of the time-series of total trade (T), 
exports (X) and imports (M) for the period of 1878-79 to 1899-
1900. The estimations are made on the basis of the least-
square method. 
 
YT =      329097.2           - 3070.217 t………(1) 
       (S.E.=46298.469)      (S.E.=3525.105)                     R2=0.037 
          (t= 7.108                (t= -0.871              F=0.759 (Sig=0.394)                    
Sig=0.000)                       Sig=0.394)                            DW=1.738 
 
YM =    153998.7          - 526.401 t   ……….(2) 
       (S.E.=19657.174)      (S.E.=1496.672)                     R2=0.006 
          (t= 7.834                  (t= -0.352            F=0.124 (Sig=0.729) 
          Sig=0.000)              Sig=0.729)                           DW=1.778 
 
YX =     178137.5           -  2730.207 t   …….…(3) 
       (S.E.=28762.356)      (S.E.=2189.928)                       R2=.072 
          (t= 6.193                  (t= -1.247            F=1.554 (Sig=0.227) 
          Sig=0.000)              Sig=0.227)                           DW=1.592 
 
where t represents year. 
Fig 1: Bhutan's trade during 1879-1900
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The above Estimations do not suffer from the problem of 
autocorrelation as the observed value of Durbin-Watson (DW) 
statistic is above the tabulated value of du in each case. 
Against the relevant tabulated value of du at 1.174 at 1% 
level, its observed value is 1.738 for Estimation (1), 1.778 for 
Estimation (2) and 1.592 for Estimation (3). However, the 
most revealing finding of this exercise is that the results 
corroborate negative impacts of the political events of the late 
nineteenth century Bhutan on her trade. According to our 
estimates, the annual rate of decline during 1878-79/ 1899-
1900 was about Rs.526 for import and Rs.2730 for export. 
The latter was thus worse hit. Total trade, however, suffered 
annually by around Rs.3070. The precisions of these 
estimates are, however, doubtful because of their high 
standard errors, viz. 1496, 2190 and 3525 respectively. 
Moreover, the R2 and F-statistic are found very low for all the 
estimated relations indicating thereby that the relations are 
insignificant. Even if we do not accept a strong negative trend 
in these series, we may certainly conclude that there was 
stagnation in Bhutan’s import and export trade during 1878-
99 with a definite tilt to fall. And these tilts were, indeed, due 
to her internal political disturbances.  
Section II: Political events in the early 1900 
The imperial expansion of Russian during the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century was a major political event in the 
Asian landscape as it caused a threat to the expansion of the 
British trade in the Himalayan kingdoms. The British 
Government in Bengal sought to politically counter this 
potential threat by involving both Tibet and Bhutan in their 
favour. Bhutan’s trading activities at the debut of the 
twentieth century were largely affected by the conflict of these 
imperial forces in the Himalayas. 
  
Recorded history informs that during the second half of the 
nineteenth century Russia had been extending her empire to 
Amur and Vladivostok with a view to setting up a naval base 
at the southern end. The objective was evidently to get rid of 
the obstacles of ice in her international sea route. By that 
 11
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time Russia became powerful in Siberia also as China was 
reduced in strength.33 Siberia was connected with her sea 
port, the Port Arthur, by a newly constructed trans-Siberian 
railway that was extended to China via Manchuria. This great 
railway was entirely supervised by the Russians so that they 
could have direct influence over a wider geographical milieu. 
 
By the end of the century Russia had also consolidated her 
political influence in Asia, particularly in the Mongolian 
domain. Her expansion became undoubtedly a real threat to 
the central Asia and the Himalayan countries. The British 
military officers were worried about the expansion of Russia 
towards Chinese Turkestan which was situated in between 
Russia and Tibet. To check Russian expansion towards 
Turkestan, the Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary Settlement 
took place in 1895. The conflict between the expansion of 
Russian and British imperialism was thus imminent. Indeed, 
the Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary Settlement (1895) that 
declared status quo across a given corridor in the western 
Himalayas resolved the tension in the west.34 But in the 
eastern Himalaya, the threat of Russian expansion remained 
unresolved as they had already reached at the door of Tibet. 
The British was seriously concerned about this development 
because, as we have already pointed out, they targeted the 
Tibetan market as an outlet of British goods, especially 
woollen fabrics. As a matter of fact, the steady growth of Indo-
Tibet trade inspired J.C. White, the British political officer in 
Sikkim, to send in 1894-95 the specimen of British woollen 
fabrics to Tibet to grab that market but ‘Lhasa was opposed 
to the entry of British and even Sikkimese subjects into 
Tibet.’ As the direct route to Tibet through Sikkim was 
obstructed by the Tibetans, Bhutan gained importance to the 
British at the end of the nineteenth century. The Russians 
had also immense trading interests at Tibet. By the end of the 
nineteenth century she had already had an extensive market 
in that country for her products like woollen cloths and glass 
                                              
33 Parker, A Historical Geography of Russia, pp. 366-367. 
34 Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, p. 168. 
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ware.35 These markets she had occupied by competing with 
the Chinese goods.36
 
In 1899 when Curzon came as Viceroy, the British 
administration was suspicious about the collusion between 
the authorities of Russia and Tibet.37 To check Russian 
expansion towards Tibet, Curzon decided to send in 1903 an 
armed mission under the leadership of Younghusband to 
develop relationship with the Dalai Lama, the political 
authority of Lhasa. In view of the fact that the British had 
previously failed to establish direct contact with him, Curzon 
sought for the assistance of Ugyen Wangchuk, the Trongsa 
Penlop of Bhutan. Ugyen Wangchuk, indeed, assisted the 
Younghusband Mission in all respects. The relationship 
between the British administration and Tibet that emerged in 
this process culminated to the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 
1904. This mission had an explicit objective to promote trade. 
Out of nine articles that were adapted in the convention, as 
many as seven were directly or indirectly related to trade 
between Tibet and Bengal. Those articles38 were: (1) new trade 
markets were to be developed at Gartok and Gyantse, (2) the 
questions of tea and tariff were agreed to be discussed later 
on,  (3) free trade provision for quota-related articles were also 
to be settled later on mutual agreement, (4) roads to new 
trade marts were to be constructed, (5) a compensation of 
Rs.75,00,000 should be given to the Tibetans at the 
installment of Rs. 100000 per year in seventy five years, (6) 
the British were to occupy Chumbi valley for the collection of 
compensation and the operation of trade marts, and (7) the 
Tibetans should destroy all forts along the Indo-Tibet border.  
 
That the Trongsa Penlop was instrumental in forging 
relationship between the British and Tibet both the 
Younghusband mission and the Viceroy of India sincerely 
acknowledged. Thus, Younghusband put on record,  
                                              
35 Collister, Bhutan and the British, p. 135. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Singh, Himalayan Triangle, p. 334. 
38 Lamb, Britain and Chinese Central Asia, pp. 302-303. 
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“The Tongsa Penlop himself, the principal man in Bhutan, 
accompanied the mission to Lhasa, put me into 
communication with leading men and was highly 
instrumental in effecting a settlement. A year ago the 
Bhutanese were strangers, today they are our enthusiastic 
allies.”39
 
In a similar tone a contemporary document notes, “His 
Excellency the Viceroy entertains no doubt that the Trongsa 
Penlop’s sound advice and exhortation to the Tibetan 
Government have been promoted by an earnest desire to 
establish feelings of friendship and good understanding 
between the parties to the recent Agreement.”40 In recognition 
to the service that Bhutan rendered, the British extended 
many facilities to that country under the recommendations of 
White who led a mission to Bhutan in 1903-05. Among others 
White recommended: (1) that the Government of India should 
enhance the subsidy to Bhutan from Rs.50000 to Rs.100000; 
(2) that the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 should be revised in 
respect of Bhutan’s foreign relation with China and Tibet; (3) 
that new roads should be constructed in Bhutan under the 
financial assistance from British India; and (4) that the Indo-
Bhutan trade relation should be improved.41 Also, the British 
administration provided compliments to the Trongsa Penlop 
Ugyen Wangchuk by conferring him the title of Knight 
Commander of the Indian Empire. He was invited as a State-
Guest of the Government of India, and given a reception 
similar to those provided to the Maharajas of Princely States. 
In 1907 when the Bhutan Darbar decided Ugyen as the 
hereditary chief, the Indian Government immediately 
supported the decision.  
 
China’s threat to Bhutan further pushed Bhutan closer to 
British India during the first quarter of twentieth century. By 
the early twentieth century it was well understood in the 
British circle in Great Britain as well as in India that Russia 
                                              
39 Quoted from Kohli, India and Bhutan, p.164. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Collister, Bhutan and the British, p. 155. 
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was no longer interested in Tibet as she was grossly involved 
in war with Japan. But since the days of the Younghusband 
mission, China had been following a policy to extend the 
border towards Tibet as well as other kingdoms in the 
Himalayas. In so far as Tibet was concerned, she was 
determined to invade the country with the hope to 
establishing her suzerainty. In a communication to Bhutan, 
China, indeed, explicitly claimed her political sovereignty over 
that country. It noted, “The Bhutanese are the subjects of the 
Emperor of China who is the Lord of Heavens, and are of the 
same religion as the other parts of the Empire. You, Deb Raja, 
and the two Penlops think that you are great, but you cannot 
continue without paying attention to the orders of your 
rulers.”42 From such a perception China directed the Deb 
Raja to develop China-Bhutan trade. The document 
instructed, “The Popon [Paymaster] will inspect your climate, 
distance of places, crops etc. Transport of fifteen ponies and 
twenty coolies must be supplied. The Deb Raja must try to 
improve the trade of the country and the condition of 
tenantry.”43
 
Bhutan did not, however, pay any attention to those Chinese 
directions and, in fact, restricted the entry of the Popons 
inside Paro. Though the Maharaja of Bhutan did not even 
meet the Chinese delegation in person the British 
administration sought to keep Bhutan under a tighter grip by 
providing her further supports such as financial and 
engineering supports to the construction of roads, managerial 
supports to her tea gardens, etc. These supportive gestures 
from the British end went a long way to improve the Indo-
Bhutan political and trade relations in the early twentieth 
century. Necessarily, those relations were based on mutual 
trust and confidence. This policy was, however, altered during 
the period of Lord Minto (1908) who favoured direct military 
intervention in the Himalayan kingdoms to check the Chinese 
aggression. Therefore, the Punakha Treaty (1910) that was 
                                              
42 Kohli, India and Bhutan, p.176. 
43 Ibid. 
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signed between British India and Bhutan promulgated the 
Bhutan government to seek mandatorily the advice of the 
British government in her external relation with other 
countries.44 This treaty thus enabled the British to trade in 
Bhutan through controlling her external affairs with other 
countries. In fact, Bhutan’s trade with British India showed a 
rising trend from the beginning of the twentieth century.  
 
We, thus, find that while the period 1878/79-1899/1900 was 
characterised with political instabilities in Bhutan, both 
internal and external, the following period of 1900/01-
1905/06 was tranquil in both these front. Since the British 
India government was largely instrumental in her emerging 
external tranquility and this they did by way of trade-centric 
policies, we reasonably expect Bhutan’s trade to exhibit rising 
trend in this period. Figure 2 confirms this. It shows that the 
period witnessed a 60.42 percent annual growth in export. 
For export and import together, the growth was from Rs. 271 
thousand in 1899-1900 to Rs. 1.27 million in 1905-06. 
Fig 2: Bhutan's trade during 1900-1906
Year
1905-061904-051903-041902-031901-021900-01
Va
lu
e 
in
 R
up
ee
s
1400000
1200000
1000000
800000
600000
400000
200000
0
EXPORT
IMPORT
TOTAL
 
                                              
44 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, p. 100. 
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Rising trends in these series are precisely estimated below on 
the basis of the least square method. The notations are as 
before.  
 
YT =      284683.8      +     128956.2 t   …….(4) 
       (S.E.=166966.4)     (S.E.=42873.004)                      R2=0.693 
             (t= 1.705                  (t=3.008           F=9.047 (Sig=0.040) 
          Sig=0.163)                 Sig=0.040)                        DW=2.683 
 
 
YX =    135752.7         +     131559.3 t   …….   (5) 
       (S.E.=158843.4)      (S.E.=40787.219)                    R2=0.722 
          (t= 0.855                       (t=3.226       F=10.404 (Sig=0.032) 
          Sig=0.440)                    Sig=0.032)                     DW=2.886 
 
 
YM =     148931.1         -     2603.114 t   ……..(6) 
       (S.E.=22072.782)      (S.E.=5667.767)                     R2=0.050 
          (t= 6.747                 (t= - 0.459            F=0.211 (Sig=0.670) 
          Sig=0.003)              Sig=0.670)                           DW=1.042 
  
For the estimated relations (4) and (5), the value of R2 is 
found moderately high, viz. 0.693 and 0.722 respectively. 
Their observed F-statistics are also found significant at more 
than 0.5 percent level. We thus infer that these estimated 
relationships are significant. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson 
(DW) statistics are found above the tabulated du level for both 
the cases so that they do not suffer from the problem of 
autocorrelation. These estimations, however, indicate that 
Bhutan’s export trade and total trade experienced steep 
upward trends during this period. Annual rates of absolute 
growth are Rs.132 thousand and Rs.129 thousand 
respectively. These estimates are significant at 0.04 percent 
and 0.03 percent respectively from the viewpoint of Student’s 
t-statistic. 
 
Estimation (6) that relates to the trend of import is, however, 
found insignificant from the viewpoints of R2 and F statistics. 
While R2 is as low as 0.211, the observed F-statistic is 
insignificant at 0.1 percent level. Moreover, the observed DW 
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statistic belongs to the inconclusive range of tabulated dL-dU. 
Hence, the goodness of fit is very poor for Bhutan’s import 
trend in this period of study. In fact, the flat segment of 
import series in Figure 2 presumes such results. Juxtapose to 
this absence of any upward trend in import, the upshot of 
Bhutan’s export in the early twentieth century bears a 
significant indication. It signifies that British India sought to 
get political relationship with Bhutan by greater in-take of 
Bhutanese goods although Bhutan did not much enhance the 
import of goods from British India in this period. This prima 
facie contradicts the widely accepted doctrine that the 
economic interest always prevails over the course of political 
actions by the ‘core’ capitalist countries. But we should note 
that British India’s trade interest with Bhutan might have 
been sacrificed for political gains. But those political gains 
were expected to promote further trade in the long-run with 
Bhutan and also with Tibet and China.  
Section III: Conclusion 
Various political events concerning Bhutan in the eighteenth-
nineteenth centuries had thus far-reaching bearings on her 
foreign trade. When the Tibetan trade route via Nepal was 
closed to the British in the late eighteenth century, the East 
India Company sought for a route to Tibet and China through 
Bhutan. But since Bhutan was stubborn not to allow transit 
trade or trade in Bhutan by the European, the Company’s 
administration in Bengal sent several political missions to 
Bhutan and Tibet. Many trade concessions were also granted 
to the Bhutanese. The Company could obtain at the end trade 
permissions for non-European traders, especially Indians. 
But the Duar War (1865) that the British indulged in for tea 
and related industries in and around Assam vitiated the 
mutual trust between British India and Bhutan. A series of 
trade-related concessions including an annual compensation 
was sanctioned to Bhutan on that occasion through the 
Sinchula Treaty (1865). But the laissez faire philosophy that 
the Treaty enshrined was not appreciated at large in the 
Bhutanese society. Moreover, the Bengal administration 
disobeyed some of its clauses. The Treaty could not, therefore, 
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bring any break-through in trading activities between these 
countries. Three successive civil wars in Bhutan during 1866-
84 further vitiated the prosperity of trade. Our trend analysis 
during 1878/79-1899/1900 has, in fact, shown that there 
was a secular decline in her imports and exports during this 
period. 
 
The following period of 1900/01-1905/06 brought trade 
prosperity to Bhutan based on the privileges that British 
India granted to her. The British sanctioned those 
concessions with a view to checking the expansion of the 
Russian imperialism in the Eastern Himalayas, especially the 
kingdoms of Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal. In fact, with the help of 
the Trongsa Penlop of Bhutan, the British mission could 
establish a liaison with Tibet. The Chinese threat to Bhutan 
also induced the British to keep her under a tight grip. 
Because of benevolent British policies, however, Bhutan’s 
trade grew rapidly during this period. Our trend analysis 
suggests that her export trade took a steep upward turn 
during 1900/01-1905/06 although her import trade 
remained largely stagnant. 
 
There is no doubt that the British and the Bhutanese worked 
together for their mutual interests. The Trongsa Penlop 
assisted the British during the Younghusband mission for 
several reasons. He knew that Bhutan depended on the 
annual subsidy given by the British Government, and its 
withdrawal might be dangerous for the Bhutanese economy.45 
Moreover, he was very much concerned about trade, and 
strongly believed that the occupation of Chumbi valley by the 
British might help them move forward in trade-related issues. 
After becoming the hereditary monarch of Bhutan in 1907, 
Ugyen Wangchuk focused on improving the country’s 
economic conditions through various schemes. Those 
initiatives and efforts established a firm relation between 
Bhutan and British India during his reign.  
                                              
45 Kohli, India and Bhutan, p.160. 
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